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Abstract
We outline the rationale and preliminary results of using the State
Context Property (SCOP) formalism, originally developed as a gen-
eralization of quantum mechanics, to describe the contextual manner
in which concepts are evoked, used, and combined to generate mean-
ing. The quantum formalism was developed to cope with problems
arising in the description of (1) the measurement process, and (2)
the generation of new states with new properties when particles be-
come entangled. Similar problems arising with concepts motivated the
formal treatment introduced here. Concepts are viewed not as fixed
representations, but entities existing in states of potentiality that re-
quire interaction with a context—a stimulus or another concept—to
‘collapse’ to an instantiated form (e.g. exemplar, prototype, or other
possibly imaginary instance). The stimulus situation plays the role of
the measurement in physics, acting as context that induces a change
of the cognitive state from superposition state to collapsed state. The
collapsed state is more likely to consist of a conjunction of concepts
for associative than analytic thought because more stimulus or con-
cept properties take part in the collapse. We provide two contextual
measures of conceptual distance—one using collapse probabilities and
the other weighted properties—and show how they can be applied to
conjunctions using the pet fish problem.
∗Published as: Gabora, L. and Aerts, D. (2002). Contextualizing concepts using a
mathematical generalization of the quantum formalism. Journal of Experimental and
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 14, pp. 327-358.
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1 Introduction
Theories of concepts have by and large been representational theories. By
this we mean that concepts are seen to take the form of fixed mental rep-
resentations, as opposed to being constructed, or ‘re-constructed’, on the
fly through the interaction between the cognitive state and the situation or
context.
Representational theories have met with some success. They are ad-
equate for predicting experimental results for many dependent variables
including typicality ratings, latency of category decision, exemplar gener-
ation frequencies, and category naming frequencies. However increasingly,
for both theoretical and empirical reasons, they are coming under fire (e.g.
Riegler, Peschl and von Stein 1999, Rosch 1999). As Rosch puts it, they
do not account for the fact that concepts have a participatory, not an iden-
tifying function in situations. That is, they cannot explain the contextual
manner in which concepts are evoked and used (see also Murphy and Medin
1985, Hampton 1987, Medin and Shoben 1988, Gerrig and Murphy 1992,
Komatsu 1992). Contextuality is the reason why representational theories
cannot describe or predict what happens when two or more concepts arise
together, or follow one another, as in the creative generation or interpreta-
tion of conjunctions of concepts.
This paper shows how formalisms designed to cope with context and
conjunction in the microworld may be a source of inspiration for a description
of concepts. In this contextualized theory1, not only does a concept give
meaning to a stimulus or situation, but the situation evokes meaning in the
concept, and when more than one is active they evoke meaning in each other.
2 Limitations of Representational Approaches
We begin by briefly summarizing some of the most influential representa-
tional theories of concepts, and efforts to delineate what a concept is with
the notion of conceptual distance. We then discuss difficulties encountered
with representational approaches in predicting membership assessment for
conjunctions of concepts. We then show that representational theories have
1Not to be confused with the context model (Medin and Schaffer 1978, Nosofsky 1986),
an exemplar-based representational theory. Whereas in the context model, a concept
is viewed as a static representation derived from context-specific concretely-experienced
instances, in our approach, a concept is viewed as a predisposition to dynamically at-
tract context-specific cognitive states (both concrete stimulus experiences and imagined
or counterfactual situations) into a certain subspace of conceptual space.
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even more trouble coping with the spontaneous emergence or loss of features
that can occur when concepts combine.
2.1 Theories of Concepts and Conceptual Distance
According to the classical theory of concepts, there exists for each concept a
set of defining features that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient (e.g.
Sutcliffe 1993). Extensive evidence has been provided against this theory
(for overviews see Smith and Medin 1981, Komatsu 1992).
A number of alternatives have been put forth. According to the pro-
totype theory (Rosch 1975a, 1978, 1983, Rosch and Mervis 1975), concepts
are represented by a set of, not defining, but characteristic features, which
are weighted in the definition of the prototype. A new item is categorized
as an instance of the concept if it is sufficiently similar to this prototype.
The prototype consists of a set of features {a1, a2, a3...aM}, with associated
weights or applicability values {x1, x2, x3...xM}, where M is the number of
features considered. The distance between a new item and the prototype
can be calculated as follows, where s indexes the test stimulus, xsm refers to
applicability of mth feature to the stimulus s, and xpm refers to applicability
of mth feature to the prototype:
ds =
√√√√ M∑
m=1
(xsm − xpm)2 (1)
The smaller the value of ds for a given item, the more representative it is of
the concept. Thus concept membership is graded, a matter of degree.
According to the exemplar theory, (e.g. Medin, Altom, and Murphy
1984, Nosofsky 1988, 1992, Heit and Barsalou 1996) a concept is repre-
sented by, not defining or characteristic features, but a set of instances of
it stored in memory. Thus each of the {E1, E2, E3, ...EN} exemplars has a
set {a1, a2, a3, ...aM} of features with associated weights {x1, x2, x3, ...xM}.
A new item is categorized as an instance of concept if it is sufficiently simi-
lar to one or more of these previously encountered instances. For example,
Storms et al. (2000) used the following distance function, where s indexes
the test stimulus, xsm refers to applicability ofm
th feature to stimulus s, and
xnm refers to applicability of m
th feature to nth most frequently generated
exemplar:
ds =
N∑
n=1
√√√√ M∑
m=1
(xsm − xnm)2 (2)
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Once again, the smaller the value of ds for a given item, the more represen-
tative it is of the concept.
Note that these theories have difficulty accounting for why items that are
dissimilar or even opposite might nevertheless belong together; for example,
whywhitemight be more likely to be categorized with black than with flat,
or why dwarf might be more likely to be categorized with giant than with,
say, salesman. The only way out is to give the set of relevant variables or
measurements or contexts the same status as the values for those variables
or measurements or contexts i.e. to lump together as features not only
things like ‘large’ but also things like ‘has a size’ or ‘degree to which size is
relevant’.
According to another approach to concepts, referred to as the theory
theory, concepts take the form of ‘mini-theories’ (e.g. Murphy and Medin
1985) or schemata (Rummelhart and Norman 1988), in which the causal
relationships amongst features or properties are identified. A mini-theory
contains knowledge concerning both which variables or measurements are
relevant, and the values obtained for them. This does seem to be a step
toward a richer understanding of concept representation, though many lim-
itations have been pointed out (see for example Komatsu 1992, Fodor 1994,
Rips 1995). Clearly, the calculation of conceptual distance is less straight-
forward, though to us this reveals not so much a shortcoming of the theory
theory, but of the concept of conceptual distance itself. In our view, concepts
are not distant from one another at all, but interwoven, and this interwoven
structure cannot be observed directly, but only indirectly, as context-specific
instantiations. For example, the concept egg will be close to sun in the con-
text ‘sunny side up’ but far in the context ‘scrambled’, and in the context
of the Dr. Suess book ‘Green Eggs and Ham’ it acquires the feature ‘green’.
Yet another theory of concepts, which captures their mutable, context-
dependent nature, but at the cost of increased vagueness, is psychological
essentialism. The basic idea is that instances of a concept share a hidden
essence which defines its true nature (e.g. Medin and Ortony 1989). In this
paper we attempt to get at this notion in a more rigorous and explicit way
than has been done.
2.2 Membership Assessments for Conjunctive Categories
The limitations of representational theories became increasingly evident
through experiments involving conjunctions of concepts. One such anoma-
lous phenomenon is the so-called guppy effect, where a guppy is not rated as
a good example of the concept pet, nor of the concept fish, but it is rated as
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a good example of pet fish (Osherson and Smith 1981)2. Representational
theories cannot account for this. Using the prototype approach, since a
guppy is neither a typical pet nor a typical fish, ds for the guppy stimulus is
large for both pet and fish, which is difficult to reconcile with the empirical
result that it is small for pet fish. Using the exemplar approach, although
a guppy is an exemplar of both pet and fish, it is unlikely to be amongst
the n most frequently generated ones. Thus once again ds is large for both
pet and fish, which is difficult to reconcile with it being small for pet fish.
The problem is not solved using techniques from fuzzy set mathemat-
ics such as the minimum rule model, where the typicality of a conjunction
(conjunction typicality) equals the minimum of the typicalities of the two
constituent concepts (Zadeh 1965, 1982). (For example, the typicality rat-
ing for pet fish certainly does not equal the minimum of that for pet or
fish.) Storms et al. (2000) showed that a weighted and calibrated version
of the minimum rule model can account for a substantial proportion of the
variance in typicality ratings for conjunctions exhibiting the guppy effect.
They suggested the effect could be due to the existence of contrast categories,
the idea being that a concept such as fruit contains not only information
about fruit, but information about categories that are related to, yet differ-
ent from, fruit. Thus, a particular item might be a better exemplar of the
concept fruit if it not only has many features in common with exemplars of
fruit but also few features in common with exemplars of vegetables (Rosch
and Mervis 1975). However, another study provided negative evidence for
contrast categories (Verbeemen et al. in press).
Nor does the theory theory or essence approach get us closer to solving
the conjunction problem. As Hampton (1997) points out, it is not clear
how a set of syntactic rules for combining or interpreting combinations of
mini-theories could be formulated.
2.3 ‘Emergence’ and Loss of Properties During Conjunction
An even more perplexing problem facing theories of concepts is that, as
many studies (e.g. Hastie et. al. 1990, Kunda et. al. 1990, Hampton
1997) have shown, a conjunction often possesses features which are said to
be emergent: not true of its’ constituents. For example, the properties ‘lives
in cage’ and ‘talks’ are considered true of pet birds, but not true of pets
or birds.
2In fact, it has been demonstrated experimentally that other conjunctions are better
examples of the ‘guppy effect’ than pet fish (Storms et al. 1998), but since this example
is well-known, we will continue to use it here.
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Representational theories are not only incapable of predicting what sorts
of features will emerge (or disappear) in the conjunctive concept, but they
do not even provide a place in the formalism for the gain (or loss) of features.
This problem stems back to a limitation of the mathematics underlying not
only representational theories of concepts (as well as compositional theo-
ries of language) but also classical physical theories. The mathematics of
classical physics only allows one to describe a composite or joint entity by
means of the product state space of the state spaces of the two subentities.
Thus if X1 is the state space of the first subentity, and X2 the state space
of the second, the state space of the joint entity is the Cartesian product
space X1 ×X2. For this reason, classical physical theories cannot describe
the situation wherein two entities generate a new entity with properties not
strictly inherited from its constituents.
One could try to solve the problem ad hoc by starting all over again
with a new state space each time there appears a state that was not possible
given the previous state space; for instance, every time a conjunction like pet
bird comes into existence. However, this happens every time one generates
a sentence that has not been used before, or even uses the same sentence in
a slightly different context. Another possibility would be to make the state
space infinitely large to begin with. However, since we hold only a small
number of items in mind at any one time, this is not a viable solution to the
problem of describing what happens in cognition. This problem is hinted
at by Boden (1990), who uses the term impossibilist creativity to refer to
creative acts that not only explore the existing state space but transform
that state space; in other words, it involves the spontaneous generation of
new states with new properties.
2.4 The ‘Obligatory Peeking’ Principle
In response to difficulties concerning the transformation of concepts, and
how mini-theories combine to form conjunctions, Osherson and Smith (1981)
suggested that, in addition to a modifiable mini-theory, concepts have a sta-
ble definitional core. It is the core, they claim, that takes part in the combin-
ing process. However, the notion of a core does not straightforwardly solve
the conjunction problem. Hampton (1997) suggests that the source of the
difficulty is that in situations where new properties emerge during concept
conjunction, one is making use of world knowledge, or ‘extensional feedback’.
He states: ‘We can not expect any model of conceptual combination to ac-
count directly for such effects, as they clearly relate to information that is
obtained from another source—namely familiarity with the class of objects
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in the world’ (p. 148). Rips (1995) refers to this as the No Peeking Principle.
Rips’ own version of a dual theory distinguishes between representations-of
and representations-about, both of which are said to play a role in conjunc-
tion. However, he does not claim to have solved the problem of how to
describe concepts and their conjunctions, noting ‘It seems likely that part
of the semantic story will have to include external causal connections that
run through the referents and their representations’ (p. 84).
Goldstone and Rogosky’s (in press) ABSURDIST algorithm is a move
in this direction. Concept meaning depends on a web of relations to other
concepts in the same domain, and the algorithm uses within-domain simi-
larity relations to translate across domains. In our contextualized approach,
we take this even further by incorporating not just pre-identified relations
amongst concepts, but new relations made apparent in the context of a par-
ticular stimulus situation, i.e. the external world. We agree that it may be
beyond our reach to predict exactly how world knowledge will come into play
in every particular case. However, it is at least possible to put forth a theory
of concepts that not only allows ‘peeking’, but in a natural (as opposed to ad
hoc) way provides a place for it. In fact, in our model, peeking (from either
another concept, or an external stimulus) is obligatory; concepts require a
peek, a context, to actualize them in some form (even if it is just the most
prototypical form). The core or essence of a concept is viewed as a source of
potentiality which requires some context to be dynamically actualized, and
which thus cannot be described in a context-independent manner (except
as a superposition of every possible context-driven instantiation of it). In
this view, each of the two concepts in a conjunction constitutes a context
for the other that ‘slices through’ it at a particular angle, thereby mutually
actualizing one another’s potentiality in a specific way. As a metaphorical
explanatory aid, if concepts were apples, and the stimulus a knife, then the
qualities of the knife would determine not just which apple to slice, but
which direction to slice through it. Changing the knife (the context) would
expose a different face of the apple (elicit a different version of the concept).
And if the knife were to slash through several apples (concepts) at once, we
might end up with a new kind of apple (a conjunction).
3 Two Cognitive Modes: Analytic and Associative
We have seen that, despite considerable success when limited to simple con-
cepts like bird, representational theories run into trouble when it comes to
conjunctions like pet bird or even green bird. In this section we address
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the question: why would they be so good for modeling many aspects of
cognition, yet so poor for others?
3.1 Creativity and Flat Associative Hierarchies
It is widely suggested that there exist two forms of thought (e.g. James
1890, Piaget 1926, Neisser 1963, Johnson-Laird 1983, Dennett 1987, Dartnell
1993, Sloman 1996, Rips 2001). One is a focused, evaluative analytic mode,
conducive to analyzing relationships of cause and effect. The other is an
intuitive, creative associative mode that provides access to remote or subtle
connections between features that may be correlated but not necessarily
causally related. We suggest that while representational theories are fairly
adequate for predicting and describing the results of cognitive processes that
occur in the analytic mode, their shortcomings are revealed when it comes to
predicting and describing the results of cognitive processes that occur in the
associative mode, due to the more contextual nature of cognitive processes
in this mode.
Since the associative mode is thought to be more evident in creative indi-
viduals, it is useful at this point to look briefly at some of the psychological
attributes associated with creativity. Martindale (1999) has identified a
cluster of such attributes, including defocused attention (Dewing and Bat-
tye 1971, Dykes and McGhie 1976, Mendelsohn 1976), and high sensitivity
(Martindale and Armstrong 1974, Martindale 1977), including sensitivity to
subliminal impressions; that is, stimuli that are perceived but of which we
are not conscious of having perceived (Smith and Van de Meer 1994).
Another characteristic of creative individuals is that they have flat asso-
ciative hierarchies (Mednick 1962). The steepness of an individual’s associa-
tive hierarchy is measured experimentally by comparing the number of words
that individual generates in response to stimulus words on a word associa-
tion test. Those who generate only a few words in response to the stimulus
have a steep associative hierarchy, whereas those who generate many have
a flat associative hierarchy. Thus, once such an individual has run out of
the more usual associations (e.g. chair in response to table), unusual ones
(e.g. elbow in response to table) come to mind.
It seems reasonable that in a state of defocused attention and height-
ened sensitivity, more features of the stimulus situation or concept under
consideration get processed. (In other words, the greater the value for M in
equations (1) and (2) for prototype and exemplar theories.) It also seems
reasonable that flat associative hierarchies result from memories and con-
cepts being more richly etched into memory; thus there is a greater likelihood
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of an associative link between any two concepts. The experimental evidence
that flat associative hierarchies are associated with defocused attention and
heightened sensitivity suggests that the more features processed, the greater
the potential for associations amongst stored memories and concepts. We
can refer to the detail with which items are stored in memory as associative
richness.
3.2 Activation of Conceptual Space: Spiky versus Flat
We now ask: how might different individuals, or a single individual under
different circumstances, vary with respect to degree of detail with which the
stimulus or object of thought gets etched into memory, and resultant degree
of associative richness3? A means of accomplishing this can be seen in neural
networks that use a radial basis function (RBF), where each input activates
a hypersphere of hidden nodes, with activation tapering off in all directions
according to a (usually) Gaussian distribution of width σ (Willshaw and
Dayan, 1990, Hancock et al., 1991, Holden and Niranjan, 1997, Lu et al.
1997)4. Thus if σ is small, the input activates few memory locations but
these few are hit hard; we say the activation function is spiky. If σ is large,
the input activates many memory locations to an almost equal degree; we
say the activation function is relatively flat.
Whether or not human memory works like a RBF neural network, the
idea underlying them suggests a basis for the distinction between associative
and analytic modes of thought. We will use the terms spiky and flat activa-
tion function to refer to the extent to which memory gets activated by the
stimuli or concepts present in a given cognitive state, bearing in mind that
this may work differently in human cognition than in a neural network.5
3In (Gabora 2000, 2002a, 2002b) the cognitive mechanisms underlying creativity are
discussed in greater detail.
4This enables one part of the network to be modified without interfering with the
capacity of other parts to store other patterns.
5In a neural network, the center of the RBF (as well as the value for σ) are determined
during a training phase. However, this is not necessary if memory locations simply differ
in their capacity to detect and respond to different features. According to the temporal
coding hypothesis, different features or stimulus dimensions are carried by different fre-
quencies like a radio broadcast system, and each memory location is attuned to respond to
a slightly different frequency, or set of frequencies. (e.g. Stumpf 1965, Campbell and Rob-
son 1968, Perkell and Bullock 1968, Emmers 1981, Lestienne and Strehler 1987, Abeles et
al. 1993, Mountcastle 1993, Cariani 1995, 1997, Metzinger 1995, Lestienne 1996, Riecke
and Warland 1997, for reviews see De Valois and De Valois 1988, Pribram 1991). As
Cariani points out, temporal coding drastically simplifies the problem of how the brain
coordinates, binds, and integrates information. The greater the number of stimulus fre-
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The basic idea then is that when the activation function is spiky, only the
most typical, central features of a stimulus or concept are processed. This is
conducive to analytic thought where remote associations would be merely a
distraction; one does not want to get sidetracked by features that are atypi-
cal, or modal (Rips 2001), which appear only in imagined or counterfactual
instances. However, as the number of features or stimulus dimensions in-
creases, features that are less central to the concept that best categorizes it
start to get included, and these features may in fact make it defy straightfor-
ward classification as strictly an instance of one concept or another. When
the activation function is relatively flat, more features are attended and par-
ticipate in the process of activating and evoking from memory; atypical as
well as typical ones. Therefore, more memory locations participate in the
release of ‘ingredients’ for the next instant. These locations will have previ-
ously been modified by (and can therefore be said to ‘store’ in a distributed
manner) not only concepts that obviously share properties with the stim-
ulus, but also concepts that are correlated with it in unexpected ways. A
flat activation function is conducive to creative, associative thought because
it provides a high probability of evoking one or more concepts not usually
associated with the stimulus.
Thus we propose that representational theories—in which concepts are
depicted as fixed sets of attributes—are adequate for modeling analytical
processes, which establish relationships of cause and effect amongst con-
cepts in their most prototypical forms. However they are not adequate for
modeling associative processes, which involve the identification of correla-
tions amongst more richly detailed, context-specific forms of concepts. In
a particular instant of thought or cognitive state in the associative mode,
aspects of a situation the relevance of which may not be readily apparent,
or relations to other concepts which have gone unnoticed—perhaps of an
analogical or metaphorical nature—can ‘peek through’. A cognitive state in
which a new relationship amongst concepts is identified is a state of poten-
tiality, in the sense that the newly identified relationship could be resolved
different ways depending on the contexts one encounters, both immediately,
and down the road. For example, consider the cognitive state of the person
who thought up the idea of building a snowman. It seems reasonable that
this involved thinking of snow not just in terms of its most typical features
such as ‘cold’ and ‘white’, but also the less typical feature ‘moldable’. At
the instant of inventing snowman there were many ways of resolving how
quencies impacting the memory architecture, the greater the number of memory locations
that respond.
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to give it a nose. However, perhaps because the inventor happened to have a
carrot handy, the concept snowman has come to acquire the feature ‘carrot
nose’.
4 A Formalism that Incorporates Context
We have seen that representational theories are good for describing and pre-
dicting the outcomes of experiments involving single concepts, particularly
typical contexts, or relationships of causation. But they are not good at
predicting the outcomes of experiments involving concepts in atypical con-
texts, or creatively blended together through the discovery of some unlikely
correlation. This story has a precedent. Classical physics does exceedingly
well at describing and predicting relationships of causation, but it is much
less powerful in dealing with results of experiments that entail sophisticated
relationships of correlation. It cannot describe certain types of correlations
that appear when quantum entities interact and combine to form joint en-
tities. According to the dynamical evolution described by the Schro¨dinger
equation, whenever there is interaction between quantum entities, they spon-
taneously enter an entangled state that contains new properties that the
original entities did not have. The description of this birth of new states
and new properties required the quantum mechanical formalism.
Another way in which the shortcomings of classical mechanics were re-
vealed had to do in a certain sense with the issue of ‘peeking’. A quantum
particle could not be observed without disturbing it; that is, without chang-
ing its state. Classical mechanics could describe situations where the effect
of a measurement was negligible, but not situations where the measurement
intrinsically influenced the evolution of the entity. The best it could do is to
avoid as much as possible any influence of the measurement on the physical
entity under study. As a consequence, it had to limit its set of valuable ex-
periments to those that have almost no effect on the physical entity (called
observations). It could not incorporate the context generated by a measure-
ment directly into the formal description of the physical entity. This too
required the quantum formalism.
In this section we first describe the pure quantum formalism. Then we
briefly describe the generalization of it that we apply to the description of
concepts.
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4.1 Pure Quantum Formalism
In quantum mechanics, the state of a physical entity can change in two ways:
(1) under the influence of a measurement context, and this type of change is
called collapse, and (2) under the influence of the environment as a whole,
and this change is called evolution. In quantum mechanics, a state ψ is
represented by a unit vector of a complex Hilbert space H, which is a vector
space over the complex numbers equipped with an inproduct (see Appendix
A). A property of the quantum entity is described by a closed subspace
of the complex Hilbert space or by the orthogonal projection operator P
corresponding to this closed subspace, and a measurement context by a self-
adjoint operator on the Hilbert space, or by the set of orthogonal projection
operators that constitute the spectral family of this self-adjoint operator
(see appendix B). If a quantum entity is in a state ψ, and a measurement
context is applied to it, the state ψ changes to the state
P (ψ)
‖P (ψ)‖ (3)
where P is the projector of the spectral family of the self-adjoint operator
corresponding to the outcome of the measurement. This change of state is
more specifically what is meant by the term collapse. It is a probabilistic
change and the probability for state ψ to change to state P (ψ)/‖P (ψ)‖
under influence of the measurement context is given by
〈ψ,P (ψ)〉 (4)
where 〈 , 〉 is the inproduct of the Hilbert space (see appendix B).
The state prior to, and independent of, the measurement, can be re-
trieved as a theoretical object—the unit vector of complex Hilbert space—
that reacts to all possible measurement contexts in correspondence with
experimental results. One of the merits of quantum mechanics is that it
made it possible to describe the undisturbed and unaffected state of an en-
tity even if most of the experiments needed to measure properties of this
entity disturb this state profoundly (and often even destroy it). In other
words, the message of quantum mechanics is that is possible to describe a
reality that only can be known through acts that alter this reality.
There is a distinction in quantum mechanics between similarity in terms
of which measurements or contexts are relevant, and similarity in terms
of values for these measurements (a distinction which we saw in section
two has not been present in theories of concepts). Properties for which
the same measurement—such as the measurement of spin—is relevant are
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said to be compatible with respect to this measurement. One of the axioms
of quantum mechanics—called weak modularity—is the requirement that
orthogonal properties—such as ’spin up’ and ’spin down’—are compatible.
In quantum mechanics, the conjunction problem is seriously addressed,
and to some extent solved, as follows. When quantum entities combine, they
do not stay separate as classical physical entities tend to do, but enter a state
of entanglement. If H1 is the Hilbert space describing a first subentity, and
H2 the Hilbert space describing a second subentity, then the joint entity is
described in the tensor product space H1 ⊗ H2 of the two Hilbert spaces
H1 and H2. The tensor product always allows for the emergence of new
states—specifically the entangled states—with new properties.
The presence of entanglement—i.e. quantum structure—can be tested
for by determining whether correlation experiments on the joint entity vi-
olate Bell inequalities (Bell 1964). Pitowsky (1989) proved that if Bell in-
equalities are satisfied for a set of probabilities concerning the outcomes of
the considered experiments, there exists a classical Kolmogorovian proba-
bility model that describes these probabilities. The probability can then be
explained as being due to a lack of knowledge about the precise state of the
system. If, however, Bell inequalities are violated, Pitowsky proved that no
such classical Kolmogorovian probability model exists. Hence, the violation
of Bell inequalities shows that the probabilities involved are nonclassical.
The only type of nonclassical probabilities that are well known in nature are
the quantum probabilities.
4.2 Generalized Quantum Formalism
The standard quantum formalism has been generalized, making it possible
to describe changes of state of entities with any degree of contextuality,
whose structure is not purely classical nor purely quantum, but something
in between (Mackey 1963, Jauch 1968, Piron 1976, 1989, 1990, Randall and
Foulis 1976, 1978, Foulis and Randall 1981, Foulis, Piron, and Randall 1983,
Pitowsky 1989, Aerts 1993, 2002, Aerts and Durt 1994a,b). The generaliza-
tions of the standard quantum formalism we use as the core mathematical
structure to replace the Hilbert space of standard quantum mechanics has
the structure of a lattice, which represents the set of properties of the entity
under consideration. Many different types of lattices have been introduced,
depending on the type of generalized approach and on the particular prob-
lem under study. This has resulted in mathematical structures that are more
elaborate than the original lattice structure, and it is one of them, namely
the state context property system, or SCOP , that we take as a starting point
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here.
Let us now outline the basic mathematical structure of a SCOP . It
consists of three sets and two functions, denoted:
(Σ,M,L, µ, ν) (5)
where:
• Σ is the set of possible states.
• M is the set of relevant contexts.
• L is the lattice which describes the relational structure of the set of
relevant properties or features.
• µ is a probability function that describes how a couple (e, p), where
p is a state, and e a context, transforms to a couple (f, q), where q is
the new state (collapsed state for context e), and f the new context.
• ν is the weight or applicability of a certain property, given a specific
state and context.
The structure L is that of a complete, orthocomplemented lattice. This
means that
• A partial order relation denoted < on L representing that the im-
plication of properties, i.e. actualization of one property implies the
actualization of another. For a, b ∈ L we have
a < b⇔ if a then b (6)
• Completeness: infimum (representing the conjunction and denoted ∧)
and supremum (representing the disjunction and denoted ∨) exists for
any subset of properties. 0, minimum element, is the infimum of all
elements of L and I, maximal element, is the supremum of all elements
of L.
• Orthocomplemented: an operation ⊥ exists, such that for a, b ∈ L we
have
(a⊥)⊥ = a (7)
a < b ⇒ b⊥ < a⊥ (8)
a ∧ a⊥ = 0 , a ∨ a⊥ = I (9)
Thus a⊥ is the ‘negation’ of a.
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• Elements of L are weighted. Thus for state p, context e and property
a there exists weight ν(p, e, a), and for a ∈ L
ν(p, e, a) + ν(p, e, a⊥) = 1 (10)
These general formalisms describe much more than is needed for quantum
mechanics, and in fact, standard quantummechanics and classical mechanics
fall out as special cases (Aerts 1983). For the SCOP description of a pure
quantum entity, see Appendix C.
It is gradually being realized that the generalized quantum formalisms
have relevance to the macroscopic world (e.g. Aerts 1991, Aerts et al.
2000a,b). Their application beyond the domain that originally gave birth to
them is not as strange as it may seem. It can even be viewed as an unavoid-
able sort of evolution, analogous to what has been observed for chaos and
complexity theory. Although chaos and complexity theory were developed
for application in inorganic physical systems, they quickly found applications
in the social and life sciences, and are now thought of as domain-general
mathematical tools with broad applicability. The same is potentially true of
the mathematics underlying the generalized quantum formalisms. Although
originally developed to describe the behavior of entities in the microworld,
there is no reason why their application should be limited to this realm.
In fact, given the presence of potentiality and contextuality in cognition, it
seems natural to look to these formalisms for guidance in the development
of a formal description of cognitive dynamics.
5 Application of SCOP to Concepts
In this section we apply the generalized quantum formalism—specifically
the SCOP—to cognition, and show what concepts reveal themselves to be
within this framework. To do this we must make a number of subtle but
essential points. Each of these points may appear strange and not completely
motivated in itself, but together they deliver a clear and consistent picture
of what concepts are.
We begin by outlining some previous work in this direction. Next we
present the mathematical framework. Then we examine more closely the
roles of potentiality, context, collapse, and actualization. Finally we will
focus more specifically on how the formalism is used to give a measure of
conceptual distance. This is followed up on in the next section which shows
using a specific example how the formalism is applied to concept conjunction.
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5.1 Previous Work
One of the first applications of these generalized formalisms to cognition was
modeling the decision making process. Aerts and Aerts (1994) proved that in
situations where one moves from a state of indecision to a decided state (or
vice versa), and the change of state is context-dependent, the probability
distribution necessary to describe it is non-Kolmogorovian. Therefore a
classical probability model cannot be used. Moreover, they proved that
such situations can be accurately described using these generalized quantum
mathematical formalisms. Their mathematical treatment also applies to the
situation where a cognitive state changes in a context-dependent way to
an increasingly specified conceptualization of a stimulus or situation. Once
again, context induces a nondeterministic change of the cognitive state which
introduces a non-Kolmogorovian probability on the state space. Thus, a
nonclassical (quantum or generalized quantum) formalism is necessary.
Using an example involving the concept cat and instances of cats, we
proved that Bell inequalities are violated in the relationship between a con-
cept and specific instances of it (Aerts et al. 2000a). Thus we have evidence
that this formalism reflects the underlying structure of concepts. In (Aerts
et al. 2000c) we show that this result is obtained because of the presence of
nonlocality, that is, EPR-type correlations, amongst the properties of con-
cepts. The EPR nature of these correlations arises because of how concepts
exist in states of potentiality, with the presence or absence of particular
properties being determined in the process of the evoking or actualizing of
the concept. In such situations, the mind handles disjunction in a quantum
manner. It is to be expected that such correlations exist not only amongst
different instances of a single concept, but amongst different related con-
cepts, which makes the notion of conceptual distance even more suspect.
5.2 Mathematical Framework
In the development of this approach, it became clear that to be able to
describe contextual interactions and conjunctions of concepts, it is useful
to think not just in terms of concepts per se, but in terms of the cognitive
states that instantiate them. Each concept is potentially instantiated by
many cognitive states; in other words, many thoughts or experiences are
interpreted in terms of any given concept. This is why we first present the
mathematical structure that describes an entire conceptual system, or mind.
We will then illustrate how concepts appear in this structure. We use the
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mathematical structure of a state context property system or SCOP :
(Σ,M,L, µ, ν) (11)
where
• Σ is the set of all possible cognitive states, sometimes referred to as
conceptual space. We use symbols p, q, r, . . . to denote states.
• M is the set of relevant contexts that can influence how a cognitive
state is categorized or conceptualized. We use symbols e, f, g, . . . to
denote contexts.
• L is the lattice which describes the relational structure of the set of
relevant properties or features. We use symbols a, b, c, . . . to denote
features or properties.
• µ is a probability function that describes how a couple (e, p), where
p is a state, and e a context, transforms to a couple (f, q), where q is
the new state (collapsed state for context e), and f the new context.
• ν is the weight or applicability of a certain property, given a specific
state and context.
By cognitive states we mean states of the mind (the mind being the entity
that experiences them). Whereas the two sets Σ and M, along with the
function µ, constitute the set of possible cognitive states and the contexts
that evoke them, the set L and the function ν, describe properties of these
states, and their weights. In general, a cognitive state p ∈ Σ under context
e (the stimulus) changes to state q ∈ Σ according to probability function
µ. Even if the stimulus situation itself does not change, the change of state
from p to q changes the context (i.e. the stimulus is now experienced in the
context of having influenced the change of state from p and q). Thus we
have a new context f . For a more detailed exposition of SCOP applied to
cognition, see appendix D.
5.3 How Concepts Appear in the Formalism
We denote concepts by the symbols A,B,C, . . ., and the set of all concepts
A. A concept appears in the formalism as a subentity of this entire cog-
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nitive system, the mind6. This means that if we consider a cognitive state
p ∈ Σ, for each concept A ∈ A, there exists a corresponding state pA of
this concept. The concept A ∈ A is described by its own SCOP denoted
(ΣA,M, µA,LA, νA), where ΣA is the set of states of this concept, andM is
the set of contexts. Remark that M is the same for different concepts, and
for the mind as a whole, because all contexts that are relevant for the mind
as a whole are also relevant for a single concept. Furthermore, µA describes
the probabilities of collapse between states and contexts for this concept,
and LA and νA refer to the set of features and weights relevant to concept
A. When we speak of the potentiality of a concept, we refer to the total-
ity of ways in which it could be actualized, articulated, or experienced in a
cognitive state, given all the different contexts in which it could be relevant.
5.3.1 Instantiation of Concept Actualizes Potential
For a set of concepts {A1, A2, . . . , An, . . .}, where Ai ∈ A ∀i, the cognitive
state p can be written (pA1 , pA2 , pA3 , . . . , pAn , . . .}, where each pAi is a state
of concept Ai. For a given context e ∈ M, each of these states pA could be a
potentiality state or a collapsed state. Let us consider the specific situation
where the cognitive state p instantiates concept Am. What this explicitly
means is that pAm , the state of concept Am, becomes an actualized cognitive
state, and this corresponds to the evoking of concept Am. At the instant
Am is evoked in cognitive state p, its potentiality is momentarily deflated or
collapsed with respect to the given context e.
5.3.2 Uninstantiated Concepts Retain Potential
Let us continue considering the specific situation where state p instantiates
concept Am under context e. For each concept Ai where i 6= m, no in-
stantiation takes place, and state pAi remains a complete potentiality state
for context e. Thus, concepts that are not evoked in the interpretation of
a stimulus to become present in the cognitive state retain their potential-
ity. This means they are not limited to a fixed set of features or relations
amongst features. The formalism allows for this because the state space
6To exactly express mathematically how a concept constitutes a subentity of the mind
we must define what are the morphisms of the SCOP , and more generally the mathe-
matical category SCOP of the state context property systems and their morphisms. We
use the word category here as it is used in the mathematical discipline category theory.
For details see (Aerts 2002, Aerts and Gabora 2002) where the category SCOP, and the
notion of subentity, are discussed at length.
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where a concept ‘lives’ is not limited a priori to features thought to be rele-
vant. It is this that allows both their contextual character to be expressed,
with new features emerging under new contexts. Given the right context
were to come along, any feature could potentially become incorporated into
an instantiation of it.
5.3.3 Concepts as Contexts and Features
In addition to appearing as subentities instantiated by cognitive states, con-
cepts appear in the formalism in two other ways. First, they can constitute
(part of) a context e ∈ M. Second, something that constitutes a feature
or property a ∈ L in one situation can constitute a concept in another; for
instance, ‘blue’ is a property of the sky, but also one has a concept blue.
Thus, the three sets Σ, M and L, of a SCOP are all in some way affected
by concepts.
5.3.4 Conjunctions of Concepts
As mentioned previously, the operation applied to pure quantum entities is
the tensor product. The algebraic operation we feel to be most promising for
the description of conjunction of concepts is the following. In a SCOP , there
is a straightforward connection between the state of the entity under con-
sideration at a certain moment, and the set of properties that are actual at
that moment 7. This makes it possible to, for a certain fixed property a ∈ L,
introduce what is called the relative SCOP for a, denoted (Σ,M, µ,L, ν)a.
Suppose that (Σ,M, µ,L, ν) describes concept A, then (Σ,M, µ,L, ν)a de-
scribes concept A given that property a is always actual for A. We could,
for example, describe with this structure the concept pet where the prop-
erty swims is always actual. This would give us a possible model for the
conjunction of a noun concept with an adjective concept. In the case of
pet and swims this would come close to pet fish, but of course, that this
happens is certainly not a general rule. For the case of a conjunction of two
nouns, if we want to try out the relative SCOP construction, we would have
to consider the conjunctions of all possible features of the two nouns and
derive from this the SCOP that would describe the conjunction of the two
nouns.
7In earlier versions of SCOP , for example in (Aerts 1982, Piron 1976, 1989, 1990),
both were even identified.
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5.4 Superposition, Potentiality Couples, and Change of Cog-
nitive State
We cannot specify with complete accuracy (1) the content of state p, nor (2)
the stimulus situation it faces, context e, nor (3) how the two will interact.
Therefore, any attempt to mathematically model the transition from p to
q must incorporate the possibility that the situation could be interpreted
in many different ways, and thus many different concepts (or conjunctions
of them) being activated. Within the formalism, it is the structure of the
probability field µ that describes this. For a given state p, and another state
q ∈ Σ and contexts e and f ∈ M, the probability µ(f, q, e, p) that state p
changes under the influence of context e to state q (and that e changes to f)
will often be different from zero. In the quantum language, we can express
this by saying that p is a superposition state of all the states q ∈ Σ such
that the probability µ(f, q, e, p) is nonzero for some e, f ∈ M. Note that
whether or not p is in a state of potentiality depends on the context e. It is
possible that state p would be a superposition state for e but not for another
context f . Therefore, we use the term potentiality couple (e, p).
We stress that the potentiality couple is different from the potentiality of
a concept; the potentiality couple refers to the cognitive state (in all its rich
detail) with respect to a certain context (also in all its rich detail), wherein
a particular instantiation of some concept (or conjunction of them) may be
what is being subjectively experienced. However, they are related in the
sense that the potentiality of p decreases if concepts A ∈ A evoked in it
enter collapsed states.
5.4.1 Collapse: Nondeterministic Change of Cognitive State
Following the quantum terminology, we refer to the cognitive state follow-
ing the change of state under the influence of a context as a collapsed state.
Very often, though certainly not always, a state p is a superposition state
with respect to context e and it collapses to state q which is an eigenstate8
with respect to e, but a superposition state with respect to the new con-
text f . This is the case when couple (e, p) refers to conception of stimulus
prior to categorization, and couple (f, q) refers to the new situation after
categorization has taken place.
Recall that a quantum particle cannot be observed or ‘peeked at’ without
8The terminology ‘eigenstate’ comes from quantum mechanics, and the word ‘eigen’
is the German for ‘proper’. This German terminology is reminiscent of the German
environment that gave birth to quantum mechanics.
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disturbing it; that is, without inducing a change of state. Similarly, we
view concepts as existing in states of potentiality which require a context—
activation by a stimulus or other concept that constitutes (perhaps partially)
the present cognitive state—to be elicited and thereby constitute the content
(perhaps partially) of the next cognitive state. However, just as in the
quantum case, this ‘peeking’ causes the concept to collapse from a state
of potentiality to a particular context-driven instantiation of it. Thus, the
stimulus situation plays the role of the measurement by determining which
are the possible states that can be collapsed upon; it ‘tests’ in some way
the potentiality of the associative network, forces it to actualize, in small
part, what it is capable of. A stimulus is categorized as an instance of a
specific concept according to the extent to which the conceptualization or
categorization of it constitutes a context that collapses the cognitive state
to a thought or experience of the concept.
5.4.2 Deterministic Change of Cognitive State
A special case is when the couple (e, p) is not a potentiality couple. This
means there exists a context f and a state q, such that with certainty couple
(e, p) changes to couple (f, q). In this case we call (e, p) a deterministic
couple and p a deterministic state as a member of the couple (e, p). An even
more special case is when the context e does not provoke any change of the
state p. Then the couple (e, p) is referred to as an eigencouple, and the state
p an eigenstate as a member of the couple (e, p).
5.4.3 Retention of Potentiality during Collapse
For a given stimulus e, the probability that the cognitive state p will col-
lapse to a given concept A is related to the algebraic structure of the total
state context property system (Σ,M,L, µ, ν), and most of all, to the prob-
ability field µ(f, q, e, p) that describes how the stimulus and the cognitive
state interact. It is clear that, much as the potentiality of a concept (to
be applicable in all sorts of contexts) is reduced to a single actualized al-
ternative when it collapses to a specific instantiation, the potentiality of a
stimulus (to be interpreted in all sorts of ways) is diminished when it is
interpreted in terms of a particular concept. Thus, in the collapse process,
the stimulus loses potentiality. Consider as an example the situation that
one sees a flower, but if one were to examine it more closely, one would see
that it is a plastic flower. One possibility for how a situation such as this
gets categorized or conceptualized is that extraneous or modal feature(s) are
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discarded, and the cognitive state collapses completely to the concept that
at first glance appears to best describes it: in this case, flower. We can
denote this cognitive state p1 ∈ Σ. Some of the richness of the particular
situation is discarded, but what is gained is a straightforward way of framing
it in terms of what has come before, thus immediately providing a way to
respond to it: as one has responded to similar situations in the past. This
is more likely if one is in an analytical mode and thus σ is small, such that
one does not encode subtle details (such as ‘the flower is made of plastic’).
However, a stimulus may be encoded in richer detail such that, in addi-
tion to features known to be associated with the concept that could perhaps
best describe it, atypical or modal features are encoded. This is more likely
if one is in an associative mode, and thus σ is large. Let us denote as p2 ∈ Σ
the state of perceiving something that is flower-like, but that appears to
be ‘made of plastic’. The additional feature(s) of p2 may make it more
resistant to immediate classification, thereby giving it potentiality. In the
context of wanting to make a room more cheerful it may serve the purpose
of a flower, and be treated as a flower, whereas in the context of a botany
class it will not. The state p2, that retains potentiality may be close to p1,
the completely collapsed state, but not identical to it. In general, the flatter
the activation function, the more features of the stimulus situation are per-
ceived and thus reflected to and back from the associative network. Thus
the more likely that some aspects of the situation do not fall cleanly into any
particular category or concept, and therefore the more potentiality present
in the cognitive state, and the more nonclassical the reflection process. Note
that in an associative mode, for a given cognitive state there will be more
features to be resolved, and so the variety of potential ways of collapsing
will tend to be greater. Hence the set of states that can be collapsed to is
larger.
5.4.4 Loss of Potentiality through Repeated Collapse
It seems reasonable that the presence of potentiality in a cognitive state for a
certain context is what induces the individual to continue thinking about, re-
categorizing, and reflecting on the stimulus situation. Hence if the cognitive
state is like p2, and some of the potentiality of the previous cognitive state
was retained, this retained potentiality can be collapsed in further rounds
of reflecting. Thus a stream of collapses ensues, and continues until the
stimulus or situation can be described in terms of, not just one concept
(such as flower, but a complex conjunction of concepts (such as ‘this flower
is made of plastic so it is not really a flower’). This is a third state p3,
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that again is a collapsed state, but of a more complex nature than the first
collapsed state p1 was. But it is more stable with respect to the stimulus
than p1 or p2.
The process can continue, leading to a sequence of states p3, p4, p5, . . ..
With each iteration the cognitive state changes slightly, such that over time
it may become possible to fully interpret the stimulus situation in terms of it.
Thus, the situation eventually gets interpreted as an instance of a new, more
complex concept or category, formed spontaneously through the conjunction
of previous concepts or categories during the process of reflection. The
process is contextual in that it is open to influence by those features that
did not fit the initial categorization, and by new stimuli that happen to
come along.
5.5 Contextual Conceptual Distance
We have claimed that for any concept, given the right context, any feature
could potentially become involved in its collapse, and thus the notion of
conceptual distance becomes less meaningful. However, it is possible to
obtain a measure of the distance between states of concepts, potentiality
states as well as collapsed states (which can be prototypes, exemplars, or
imaginary constructions), and this is what the formulas here measure.
5.5.1 Probability Conceptual Distance
First we define what we believe to be the most direct distance measure,
based on the probability field µ(f, q, e, p). This method is analogous to the
procedure used for calculating distance measure in quantum mechanics. We
first introduce a reduced probability:
µ : Σ×M× Σ → [0, 1] (12)
(q, e, p) 7→ µ(q, e, p) (13)
where
µ(q, e, p) =
∑
f∈M
µ(f, q, e, p) (14)
and µ(q, e, p) is the probability that state p changes to state q under the
influence of context e.
The calculation of probability conceptual distance is obtained using a
generalization of the distance in complex Hilbert space for the case of a
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pure quantum situation, as follows:
dµ(q, e, p) =
√
2(1−
√
µ(q, e, p)) (15)
We can also introduce the conceptual angle between two states, again making
use of the formula from pure quantum mechanics:
θµ(q, e, p) = arccos µ(q, e, p) (16)
We call dµ the probability conceptual distance, or the µ distance, and θµ the
probability conceptual angle, or the µ angle. For details, see appendix A
and equations (31) and (32), and remark that for unit vectors (31) reduces
to (15).
Let us consider some special cases to see more clearly what is meant by
this distance and this angle. If µ(q, e, p) = 0 we have dµ(q, e, p) =
√
2 and
θµ(q, e, p) =
pi
2
. This corresponds to the distance and angle between two
orthogonal unit vectors in a vectorspace. So orthogonality of states, when
the probability that one state changes to the other state is 0, represent the
situation where the distance is maximal (
√
2), and the angle is a straight
angle (pi
2
). If µ(q, e, p) = 1 we have dµ(q, e, p) = 0 and θµ(q, e, p) = 0. This
corresponds to the distance and angle between two coinciding unit vectors
in a vectorspace. So coincidence of states—when the probability that one
state changes to the other state = 1—represents the situation where the
distance is minimal (0), and the angle is minimal (0). For values of µ(q, e, p)
strictly between 0 and 1, we find a distance between 0 and
√
2, and an angle
between 0 and pi
2
.
It is important to remark that the distance dµ(q, e, p) and angle θµ(q, e, p)
between two states p and q is dependent on the context e that provokes
the transition from p to q. Even for a fixed context, the distance does
not necessarily satisfy the requirements that a distance is usually required
to satisfy in mathematics. For example, it is not always the case that
dµ(q, e, p) = dµ(p, e, q), because the probability µ(q, e, p) for p to change
to q under context e is not necessarily equal to the probability µ(p, e, q) for
q to change to p under context e 9.
9It is easy to give an example that illustrates this. Consider a cognitive state p consist-
ing of the concept bird, and a context e that consists of the question ‘give me a feature
of whatever concept you are thinking of’. Consider another cognitive state q consisting
of the concept feather. The probability µ(q, e, p) will be reasonably large. However, the
probability µ(p, e, q), that a cognitive state for feather collapses to a cognitive state for
bird under the context ‘give me a feature of feathers’, will be close to zero, because ‘bird’
in not a feature of feather.
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5.5.2 Property Conceptual Distance
In order to illustrate explicitly the relationship between our approach and
the distance measures provided by the prototype and exemplar approaches
described previously, we define a second distance measure based on prop-
erties. This distance measure requires data on the probability of collapse
of a cognitive state under the influence of a context to a cognitive state
in which a particular feature is activated. In order to define operationally
what this data refers to, we describe how it could be obtained experimen-
tally. One group of subjects is asked to consider one particular concept A,
and this evokes in them cognitive state p. This state will be subtly differ-
ent for each subject, depending on the specific contexts which led them to
form these concepts, but there will be nevertheless commonalities. A sec-
ond group of subjects is asked to consider another concept B, which evokes
cognitive state q. Again, q will be in some ways similar and in some ways
different for each of these subjects. The subjects are then asked to give an
example of ‘one’ feature for each one of the considered concepts. Thus, two
contexts are at play: context e that consists of asking the subject to give
a feature of the concept focused on in state p, and context f that consists
of asking the subject to give a feature of the concept focused on in state
q. Thus we have two potentiality couples (e, p) and (f, q). Suppose couple
(e, p) gives rise to the list of features {b1, b2, . . . , bK}, and couple (f, q) the
list of features {c1, c2, . . . , cL}. Some of the features may be present on both
lists, and others on only one. The two lists combined generate a third list
{a1, a2, . . . , aM}. Each feature am is active in a cognitive state rm that one
or more subjects collapses to under either context e or f . By calculating the
relative frequencies of these features, we obtain an estimate of µ(rm, e, p)
and µ(rm, f, q). The distance between p and q is now defined as follows:
dp(q, e, f, p) =
√
2√
M
√√√√ M∑
m=1
(µ(rm, e, p) − µ(rm, f, q))2 (17)
We call dp the probability property distance, or the p distance, to distinguish
it from dµ, the probability distance or µ distance.
Remark that to compare this distance dp to the µ distance dµ we in-
troduce the renormalization factor
√
2/
√
M . This is to make the maximal
distance, which is attained if |µ(rm, e, p)−µ(rm, f, q)| = 1 ∀ m, equal to
√
2.
We can also define a property conceptual distance based on weights of
properties. Given a set of features {a1, a2, . . . , aM}, for each of p and q,
ν(p, e, am) is the weight of feature am for p under context e, and ν(q, f, am)
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is the weight of feature am for q under context f . The distance between
states p and q for the two concepts under contexts e and f respectively can
be written as follows:
dw(q, e, f, p) =
√
2√
M
√√√√ M∑
m=1
(ν(p, e, am)− ν(q, f, am))2 (18)
We call dw the weight property distance. It is clear that this distance de-
pends not only on p and q, but also on the two contexts in which the weights
are obtained. How the weights depend on context follows partly from the
lattice L, which describes the relational structure of the set of features,
and how this structure is related to the structure of the probability field
µ(f, q, e, p) which gives the probabilities of collapse under a given context.
5.5.3 Relationship Between the Two Distance Measurements
It would be interesting to know whether there is a relationship between the
distance measured using the probability field and the distance measured
using weighted properties. In pure quantum mechanics, these two distances
are equal (see appendix C, equations (35) and 39)).
This could be tested experimentally as follows. Subjects are asked to
give a single feature of a given concept. We call e the context that consists
of making this request. Since a concept A evokes slightly different cogni-
tive states p in different subjects, they do not all respond with the same
feature. Thus we obtain the set of features {a1, a2, . . . , aM}. We denote
the cognitive state of a given subject corresponding to the naming of fea-
ture am by pm. The relative frequency of feature am gives us µ(pm, e, p).
In another experiment, we consider the same concept A. We consider the
set of features {a1, a2, . . . , aM} collected in the previous experiment. Now
subjects are asked to estimate the applicability of these features to this con-
cept. This gives us the weight values ν(p, e, am). Comparing the values of
µ(pm, e, p) and ν(pm, e, p) makes it possible to find the relation between the
two distances dp and da.
6 Application to the Pet Fish Problem
We now present theoretical evidence of the utility of the contextual approach
using the Pet Fish Problem. Conjunctions such as this are dealt with by
incorporating context dependency, as follows: (1) activation of pet still
rarely causes activation of guppy, and likewise (2) activation of fish still
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rarely causes activation of guppy. But now (3) pet fish causes activation of
the potentiality state pet in the context of pet fish AND fish in the context
of pet fish. Since for this potentiality state, the probability of collapsing
onto the state guppy is high, it is very likely to be activated.
6.1 The Probability Distance
Let us now calculate the various distance measures introduced in the pre-
vious section. We use equation (15) for the relevant states and contexts
involved:
dµ(q, e, p) =
√
2(1−
√
µ(q, e, p)) (19)
where µ(q, e, p) is the probability that state p changes to state q under
influence of context e. Two states and three contexts are at play if we
calculate the different distances dµ for the pet fish situation. State p is the
cognitive state of a subject before any question is asked. Contexts e, f , and
g correspond to asking subjects to give an example of pet, fish, and pet
fish respectively. State q corresponds to the cognitive state consisting of the
concept guppy.
The transition probabilities are µ(q, e, p), the probability that a subject
answers ‘guppy’ if asked to give an example of pet, µ(q, f, p), the probability
that the subject answers ‘guppy’ if asked to give and example of fish, and
µ(q, g, p), the probability that the subject answers ‘guppy’ if asked to give
and example of pet fish. The probability distances are then:
dµ(q, e, p) =
√
2(1 −
√
µ(q, e, p)) (20)
dµ(q, f, p) =
√
2(1 −
√
µ(q, f, p)) (21)
dµ(q, g, p) =
√
2(1 −
√
µ(q, g, p)) (22)
Since µ(q, e, p) and µ(q, f, p) are experimentally close to zero, while µ(q, g, p)
is close to 1, we have that dµ(q, e, p) and dµ(q, f, p) are close to
√
2 (the
maximal distance), and dµ(q, g, p) is close to zero.
6.2 The Property Distances
We only calculate explicitly the weight property distance dw, since this is
the one calculated in representational approaches. The probability property
distance dpis calculated analogously.
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Four states p, q, r, s and four contexts e, f, g, h are at play. The states p,
q, r, and s are the cognitive states consisting of guppy, pet, fish, and pet
fish respectively. The contexts e, f , g, h are the experimental situations
of being asked to rate the typicality of guppy as an instance of these four
concepts respectively. For an arbitrary feature am, the weights to consider
are ν(p, e, am), ν(q, f, am), ν(s, g, am) and ν(s, h, am). The distances are:
d(p, e, f, q) =
√√√√ M∑
m=1
(ν(p, e, am)− ν(q, f, am))2 (23)
d(p, e, g, r) =
√√√√ M∑
m=1
(ν(p, e, am)− ν(r, g, am))2 (24)
d(p, e, h, s) =
√√√√ M∑
m=1
(ν(p, e, am)− ν(s, h, am))2 (25)
Thus we have a formalism for describing concepts that is not stumped by
a situation wherein an entity that is neither a good instance of A nor B is
nevertheless a good instance of A AND B. Note that whereas in representa-
tional approaches, relationships between concepts arise through overlapping
context-independent distributions, in the present approach, the closeness of
one concept to another (expressed as the probability that its potentiality
state will collapse to an actualized state of the other) is context-dependent.
Thus it is possible for two states to be far apart with respect to a one context
(for example dµ(q, e, p), the distance between guppy and the cognitive state
of the subject prior to the context of being asked to name a pet), and close
to one another with respect to another context (for example dµ(q, g, p), the
distance between guppy and the cognitive state of the subject prior to the
context of being asked to name a pet fish).
7 Summary and Conclusions
Representational theories of concepts—such as prototype, exemplar, and
schemata or theory-based theories—have been adequate for describing cog-
nitive processes occurring in a focused, evaluative, analytic mode, where one
analyzes relationships of cause and effect. However, they have proven to be
severely limited when it comes to describing cognitive processes that occur
in a more intuitive, creative, associative mode, where one is sensitive to and
contextually responds to not just the most typical properties of an item,
but also less typical (and even hypothetical or imagined) properties. This
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mode evokes relationships of not causation, but correlation, such that new
conjunctions of concepts emerge spontaneously. This issue of conjunctions
appears to have thrown a monkey wrench into concepts research, but we
see this as a mixed blessing. It brought to light two things that have been
lacking in this research: the notion of ‘state’, and a rigorous means of coping
with potentiality and context.
First a few words about the notion of ‘state’. In representational ap-
proaches, a concept is represented by one or more of its states. A prototype,
previously encountered exemplar, or theory description constitutes merely
one state of a concept. The competition between different representational
approaches seems to boil down to ‘which of the states of a concept most
fully captures the potentiality of the concept’? Since different experimental
designs elicit different context-specific instantiations of a concept, it is not
surprising that the states focused on in one theory have greater predictive
power in some experiments, while the states focused on in another theory
have greater predictive power in others. The true state of affairs, however, is
that none of the states can represent the whole of the concept, just as none
of the states of a billiard ball can represent the whole of the billiard ball.
The billiard ball itself is described by the structure of the state space, which
includes all possible states, given the variables of interest and how they
could change. If one variable is location and another velocity, then each
location-velocity pair constitutes a state in this state space. To represent
the whole of an entity—whether it be a concept or a physical object—one
needs to consider the set of all states, and the structure this set has.
This is the motivation for describing the essence of a concept as a po-
tentiality state. The potentiality state can, under the influence of a context,
collapse to a prototype, experienced exemplar, or an imagined or counterfac-
tual instance. The set of all these states, denoted ΣA for a concept A ∈ A,
is the state space of concept A. It is this state space ΣA, as a totality,
together with the set of possible contexts M, and these two sets structured
within the SCOP (ΣA,M, µ,L, ν) that represents the concept. Hence a
concept is represented by an entire structure—including the possible states
and their properties, and the contexts that bring about change from one
state to another—rather than by one or a few specific state(s).
This brings us to the notion of context. If a theory is deficient with
respect to its consideration of state and state space, it is not unlikely to be
deficient with respect to the consideration of context, since contexts require
states upon which to act. The contextualized approach introduced here
makes use of a mathematical generalization of standard quantum mechan-
ics, the rationale being that the problems of context and conjunction are
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very reminiscent to the problems of measurement and entanglement that
motivated the quantum formalism. Below we summarize how these two
problems manifest in the two domains of physics and cognition, and how
they are handled by quantum mechanics and its mathematical generaliza-
tions.
• The Measurement Problem for Quantum Mechanics. To
know the state of a micro-entity, one must observe or measure some
property of it. However, the context of the measurement process itself
changes the state of the micro-entity from superposition state to an
eigenstate with respect to that measurement. Classical physics does
not incorporate a means of modeling change of state under the influ-
ence of context. The best it can do is to avoid as much as possible
any influence of the measurement on the physical entity under study.
However, the change of state under the influence of a measurement
context—the quantum collapse—is explicitly taken into account in the
quantum mechanical formalism. The state prior to, and independent
of, the measurement, can be retrieved as a theoretical object—the unit
vector of complex Hilbert space—that reacts to all possible measure-
ment contexts in correspondence with experimental results. Quantum
mechanics made it possible to describe the real undisturbed and un-
affected state of a physical entity even if most of the experiments that
are needed to measure properties of this entity disturb this state pro-
foundly (and often even destroy it).
• The Measurement Problem for Concepts. According to Rips’
No Peeking Principle, we cannot be expected to incorporate into a
model of a concept how the concept interacts with knowledge exter-
nal to it. But can a concept be observed, studied, or experienced in
the absence of a context, something external to it, whether that be
a stimulus situation or another concept? We think not. We adopt
a Peeking Obligatory approach; concepts require a peek—a measure-
ment or context—to be elicited, actualized, or consciously experienced.
The generalization of quantum mechanics that we use enables us to
explicitly incorporate the context that elicits a reminding of a concept,
and the change of state this induces in the concept, into the formal
description of the concept itself. The concept in its undisturbed state
can then be ‘retrieved’ as a superposition of its instantiations.
• The Entanglement Problem for Quantum Mechanics. Clas-
sical physics could successfully describe and predict relationships of
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causation. However, it could not describe the correlations and the
birth of new states and new properties when micro-entities interact
and form a joint entity. Quantum mechanics describes this as a state
of entanglement, and use of the tensor product gives new states with
new properties.
• The Entanglement Problem for Concepts. Representational
theories could successfully describe and predict the results of cog-
nitive processes involving relationships of causation. However, they
could not describe what happens when concepts interact to form a
conjunction, which often has properties that were not present in its
constituents. We treat conjunctions as concepts in the context of one
another, and we investigate whether the relative SCOP might prove
to be the algebraic operation that corresponds to conjunction.
Note that the measurement / peeking problem and the entanglement / con-
junction problem both involve context. The measurement / peeking prob-
lem concerns a context very external to, and of a different sort from, the
entity under consideration: an observer or measuring apparatus in the case
of physics, and a stimulus in the case of cognition. In the entanglement /
conjunction problem, the context is the same sort of entity as the entity
under consideration: another particle in the case of physics, or another con-
cept in the case of cognition. The flip side of contextuality is potentiality;
they are two facets of the more general problem of describing the kind of
nondeterministic change of state that takes place when one has incomplete
knowledge of the universe in which the entity (or entities) of interest, and
the measurement apparatus, are operating.
The formalisms of quantum mechanics inspired the development of math-
ematical generalizations of these formalisms such as the State COntext Prop-
erty system, or SCOP , with which one can describe situations of varying
degrees of contextuality. In the SCOP formalism, pure classical structure
(no effect of context) and pure quantum structure (completely contextual)
fall out as special cases. Applying the SCOP formalism to concepts, pure
analytic (no effect of context) and pure associative (completely contextual)
modes fall out as special cases. In an analytic mode, cognitive states con-
sist of pre-established concepts. In an associative mode, cognitive states are
likely to be potentiality states (i.e. not collapsed) with respect to contexts.
This can engender a recursive process in which the content of the cognitive
state is repeatedly reflected back at the associative network until it has been
completely defined in terms of some conjunction of concepts, and thus po-
tentiality gets reduced or eliminated with respect to the context. Eventually
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a new stimulus context comes along for which this new state is a superpo-
sition state, and the collapse process begins again. It has been proposed
that the onset of the capacity for a more associative mode of thought is
what lay behind the the origin of culture approximately two million years
ago (Gabora 1998, submitted), and that the capacity to shift back and forth
at will from analytical to associative thought is what is responsible for the
unprecedented burst of creativity in the Middle/Upper Paleolithic (Gabora,
submitted).
We suggest that the reason conjunctions of concepts can be treated as
entangled states is because of the presence of nonlocal EPR-type correlations
amongst the properties of concepts, which arise because they exist in states
of potentiality, with the presence or absence of particular properties of a
concept being determined in the process of evoking or actualizing it. If,
concepts are indeed entangled, and thus for any concept, given the right
context, any feature could potentially become involved in its collapse, then
the notion of conceptual distance loses some meaning. What can be defined
is not the distance between concepts, but the distance between states of
them.10 That said, the measure dµ determines the distance between the
cognitive state prior to context (hence a potentiality state) to the state
after the influence of context (hence the collapsed state). The measure dp
determines distance between two potentiality states. Note that the distance
measures used in the prototype and exemplar models are actually distances
between states of concepts, not between concepts themselves. This means
that the distances we introduce are no less fundamental or real as measures
of conceptual distance.
Preliminary theoretical evidence was obtained for the utility of the ap-
proach, using the Pet Fish Problem. Conjunctions such as this are dealt
with by incorporating context-dependency, as follows: (1) activation of pet
still rarely causes activation of guppy, and likewise (2) activation of fish
still rarely causes activation of guppy. But now (3) pet fish causes acti-
vation of the superposition state pet in the context of pet fish AND fish
in the context of pet fish. Since for this superposition state the probability
of collapsing onto the state guppy is high, it is very likely to be activated.
Thus we have a formalism for describing concepts that is not stumped by the
sort of widespread anomalies that arise with concepts, such as this situation
wherein an entity that is neither a good instance of A nor B is nevertheless
10Note that this is also the case for physical entities, even in the macro-world described
by classical physics. One does not calculate the distance between two billiard balls, but
rather the distance between specific states of the two billiard balls.
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a good instance of the conjunction of A and B.
Despite our critique of representational approaches, the approach intro-
duced here was obviously derived from and inspired by them. Like exemplar
theory, it emphasizes the capacity of concepts to be instantiated as different
exemplars. In agreement to some extent with prototype theory, experienced
exemplars are ‘woven together’, though whereas a prototype is limited to
some subset of all conceivable features, a potentiality state is not. Our way
of dealing with the ‘insides’ of a concept is more like that of the theory
or schemata approach. An instance is described as, not a set of weighted
features, but a lattice that represents its relational structure. The intro-
duction of the notion of a concept core, and the return of the notion of
essence, have been useful for understanding how what is most central to a
concept could remain unscathed in the face of modification to the concept’s
mini-theory. Our distinction between state of instantiation and potentiality
state is reminiscent of the distinction between theory and core. However,
the introduction of a core cannot completely rescue the theory theory until
serious consideration has been given to state and context.
We end by asking: does the contextualized approach introduced here
bring us closer to an answer to the basic question ‘what is a concept’? We
have sketched out a theory in which concepts are not fixed representations
but entities existing in states of potentiality that get dynamically actualized,
often in conjunction with other concepts, through a collapse event that re-
sults from the interaction between cognitive state and stimulus situation
or context. But does this tell us what a concept really is? Just as was
the case in physics a century ago, the quantum formalism, while clearing
out many troubling issues, confronts us with the limitations of science. We
cannot step outside of any particular orientation and observe directly and
objectively what a concept is. The best we can do is reconstruct a concept’s
essence from the contextually elicited ‘footprints’ it casts in the cognitive
states that make up a stream of thought.
Appendices
A Complex Hilbert Space
A complex Hilbert spaceH is a set such that for two elements x, y ∈ H of this
set an operation ‘sum’ is defined, denoted x+ y, and for any element x ∈ H
and any complex number λ ∈ C, the multiplication of this element x with
this complex number λ is defined, denoted by λx. The operation ‘sum’ and
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‘multiplication by a complex number’ satisfy the normal properties that one
expect these operations to satisfy (e.g. x+y = y+x, (x+y)+z = x+(y+z),
λµx = µλx, etc, . . . A complete list of all these properties can be found in
any textbook on vector spaces). So this makes the set H into a complex
vector space, and thus we call the elements x ∈ H vectors.
In additional to the two operations of ‘sum’ and ‘multiplication by a com-
plex number’, a Hilbert space has an operation that is called the ‘inproduct
of vectors’. For two vectors x, y ∈ H the inproduct is denoted 〈x, y〉, and it
is a complex number that has the following properties. For x, y, z ∈ H, and
λ ∈ C, we have
〈x, y〉 = 〈y, x〉∗ (26)
〈x, y + λz〉 = 〈x, y〉+ λ〈x, z〉 (27)
The inproduct makes it possible to define an orthogonality relation on the
set of vectors. Two vectors x, y ∈ H are orthogonal, and we denote x ⊥ y,
if and only if 〈x, y〉 = 0. Suppose that we consider a subset A ⊂ H, then we
can introduce
A⊥ = {x | x ∈ H, x ⊥ y ∀ y ∈ A} (28)
which consists of all the vectors orthogonal to all vectors in A. It is easy to
verify that A⊥ is a subspace of H, and we call it the orthogonal subspace to
A. We can also show that A ⊂ (A⊥)⊥, and call (A⊥)⊥, also denoted A⊥⊥,
the biorthogonal subspace of A.
There is one more property satisfied to make the complex vectorspace
with an inproduct into a Hilbert space, and that is, for A ⊂ H we have:
A⊥ +A⊥⊥ = H (29)
This means that for any subset A ⊂ H, each vector x ∈ H can always be
written as the superposition
x = y + z (30)
where y ∈ A⊥ and z ∈ A⊥⊥. The inproduct also introduces for two vectors
x, y ∈ H the measure of a distance and an angle between these two vectors
as follows:
d(x, y) =
√
〈x− y, x− y〉 (31)
θ = arccos |〈x, y〉| (32)
and for one vector x ∈ H, the measure of a length of this vector
‖x‖ =
√
〈x, x〉 (33)
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This distance makes the Hilbert space a topological space (a metric space).
It can be shown that for A ⊂ H we have that A⊥ is a topologically closed
subspace of H, and that the biorthogonal operation is a closure operation.
Hence A⊥⊥ is the closure of A. This completes the mathematical definition
of a complex Hilbert space.
B Quantum Mechanics in Hilbert space
In quantum mechanics, the states of the physical entity under study are
represented by the unit vectors of a complex Hilbert space H. Properties
are represented by closed subspaces of H, hence subsets that are of the form
A⊥⊥ for some A ⊂ H. Let us denote such closed subspaces by M ⊂ H, and
the collection of all closed subspaces by P(H). For a physical entity in a
state x ∈ H, where x is a unit vector, we have that property M is ‘actual’
if and inly if x ∈ M . Suppose that we consider a physical entity in a state
x ∈ H and a property M ∈ P(H) that is not actual, hence potential. Then,
using (30), we can determine the weight of this property. Indeed there exists
vectors y, z ∈ H such that
x = y + z (34)
and y ∈M and z ∈M⊥. We call the vector y the projection of x on M , and
denote it PM (x), and the vector z the projection of x on M
⊥, and denote
it PM⊥(x). The weight ν(x,M) of the property M for the state x is then
given by
ν(x,M) = 〈x, PM (x)〉 (35)
The vectors y/‖y‖ (or PM (x)/‖PM (x)‖) and z/‖z‖ (or PM⊥(x)/‖PM⊥(x)‖)
are also called the collapsed vectors under measurement context {M,M⊥}.
An arbitrary measurement context e in quantum mechanics is represented
by a set of closed subspaces {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn, . . .} (eventually infinite), such
that
Mi ⊥Mj ∀ i 6= j (36)∑
iMi = H (37)
The effect of such a measurement context {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn, . . .} is that the
state x where the physical entity is in when the measurement context is
applied collapses to one of the states
PMi(x)
‖PMi(x)‖
(38)
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and the probability µ(PMi(x), e, x) of this collapse is given by
µ(PMi(x), e, x) = 〈x, PMi(x)〉 (39)
If we compare (35) and (39) we see that for a quantum mechanical entity
the weight of a property M for a state x is equal to the probability that
the state x will collapse to the state PM (x)/‖PM (x)‖, if the measurement
context {M,M⊥} is applied to this physical entity in this state. That is the
reason that it would be interesting to compare these quantities in the case
of concepts (see section 5.5.3).
C SCOP Systems of Pure Quantum Mechanics
The set of states ΣQ of a quantum entity is the set of unit vectors of the
complex Hilbert space H. The set of contextsMQ of a quantum entity is the
set of measurement contexts, i.e. the set of sequences {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn, . . .}
of closed subspaces of the Hilbert space H, such that
Mi ⊥Mj ∀ i 6= j (40)∑
iMi = H (41)
Such sequence is also called a spectral family. The word spectrum refers
to the set of possible outcomes of the measurement context under consid-
eration. In quantum mechanics, a state p ∈ ΣQ changes to another state
q ∈ ΣQ under influence of a context e ∈ MQ in the following way. If
{M1,M2, . . . ,Mn, . . .} is the spectral family representing the context e, and
x the unit vector representing the state p, then q is one of the unit vectors
PMi(x)
‖PMi(x)‖
(42)
and the change of x to PMi(x)/‖PMi (x)‖ is called the quantum collapse.
The probability of this change is given by
µ(e, q, e, p) = 〈x, PMi(x)〉 (43)
Remark that in quantum mechanics the context e is never changed. This
means that
µ(f, q, e, p) = 0 ∀f 6= e (44)
As a consequence, we have for the reduced probability (see (12))
µ(q, e, p) = µ(e, q, e, p) = 〈x, PMi(x)〉 (45)
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A property a of a quantum entity is represented by a closed subspace M of
the complex Hilbert space H. A property a represented by M always has
a unique orthogonal property a⊥ represented by M⊥ the orthogonal closed
subspace ofM . This orthogonal property a⊥ is the quantum-negation of the
property a. The weight ν(p, a) of a property a towards a state p is given by
ν(p, a) = 〈x, PMi(x)〉 (46)
where M represents a and x represents p. Remark that at first sight, the
weight does not appear to depend on a context, as it does for a general
state context property system. This is only partly true. In pure quantum
mechanics, the weights only depend on context in an indirect way, namely
because a property introduces a unique context, the context corresponding
to the measurement of this property. This context is represented by the
spectral family {M,M⊥}.
D SCOP Systems Applied to Cognition
A state context property system (Σ,M,L, µ, ν) consists of three sets Σ,M
and L, and two functions µ and ν.
Σ is the set of cognitive states of the subjects under investigation, while
M is the set of contexts that influence and change these cognitive states. L
represents properties or features of concepts. The function µ is defined from
the set M× Σ×M× Σ to the interval [0, 1] of real numbers, such that∑
f∈M,q∈Σ
µ(f, q, e, p) = 1 (47)
and µ(f, q, e, p) is the probability that the cognitive state p changes to cog-
nitive state q under influence of context e entailing a new context f .
We noted that properties of concepts can also be treated as concepts.
Remark also that it often makes sense to treat concepts as features. For
example, if we say ‘a dog is an animal’, it is in fact the feature ‘dog’ of
the object in front of us that we relate to the feature ‘animal’ of this same
physical object. This means that a relation like ‘dog is animal’ can be
expressed within the structure L in our formalism.
This relation is the first structural element of the set L, namely a partial
order relation, denoted <. A property a ∈ L ‘implies’ a property b ∈ L, and
we denote a < b, if and only if, whenever a is true then also b is true. This
partial order relation has the following properties. For a, b ∈ L we have:
a < a (48)
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a < b and b < a⇒ a = b (49)
a < b and b < c⇒ a < c (50)
For a set of properties {ai} there exists a conjunction property denoted ∧iai.
This conjunction property ∧iai is true if and only if all of the properties ai
are true. This means that for ai, b ∈ L we have:
b < ∧iai ⇔ b < ai ∀i (51)
The conjunction property defines mathematically an infimum for the partial
order relation <. Hence we demand that each subset of L has an infimum
in L, which makes L into a complete lattice.
Each property a also has the ‘not’ (negation) of this property, which we
denote a⊥. This is mathematically expressed by demanding that the lattice
L be equipped with an orthocomplementation, which is a function from L
to L such that for a, b ∈ L we have:
(a⊥)⊥ = a (52)
a < b⇒ b⊥ < a⊥ (53)
a ∧ a⊥ = 0 (54)
where 0 is the minimal property (the infimum of all the elements of L),
hence a property that is never true. This makes L into a complete ortho-
complemented lattice.
The function ν is defined from the set Σ ×M×L to the interval [0, 1],
and ν(p, e, a) is the weight of property a under context e for state p. For
a ∈ L we have:
ν(p, e, a) + ν(p, e, a⊥) = 1 (55)
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